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Abstract—We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on
Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits the way that
CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being
interrupted. In particular, we observe that in modern Intel CPUs,
some instruction’s execution times will depend on which oper-
ations precede and succeed them, and on their virtual addresses.
Unlike previous attacks that could only profile branches if they
contained different code or were based on conditional jumps,
the Frontal attack allows the adversary to distinguish between
instruction-wise identical branches. As the attack requires OS
capabilities to set the interrupts, we use it to exploit SGX
enclaves. Our attack demonstrates that a realistic SGX attacker
can always observe the full enclave instruction trace, and secret-
depending branching should not be used even alongside defenses
to current controlled-channel attacks. We show that the adversary
can use the Frontal attack to extract a secret from an SGX
enclave if that secret was used as a branching condition for two
instruction-wise identical branches. The attack can be exploited
against several crypto libraries and affects all Intel CPUs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s computing world runs in the cloud. Massive
datacenters maintained by cloud providers are the
infrastructure upon which companies and most of the
internet are increasingly relying on [8]. For many use cases
renting computing resources is cost-effective and convenient.
Resources can dynamically scale up when demand is high,
all the while not having to maintain them. Security-wise,
on the other hand, cloud computing is a much harder sell.
Offloading computation and data to a third party raises
questions about confidentiality and integrity. Not only could
a remote attacker rent the same server and be co-located with
the victim, but the provider itself could be malicious. In such
a scenario, hypervisors and operating systems (OS), which
usually provide isolation, can be easily compromised and thus
offer little to no assurance in terms of security.
This setting has been a driving force in recent efforts to
develop trusted execution environments (TEEs). While there
are many TEE proposals [3], [10], [11], [14], [33], [43], [46],
they are unified in their goal: providing an integrity and confi-
dentiality oasis in an environment ruled by malicious operating
systems and hypervisors. The fundamentals for this oasis are
rooted in the lowest level of the computing stack: the CPU.
When application security is provided through CPU primitives,
the layers above need not be trusted. Among all the TEE pro-
posals, Intel SGX [10] is the most widely deployed one, being
available in almost every modern consumer CPU Intel manu-
factures. It protects applications by running them in so-called
“enclaves”. SGX authenticates and encrypts enclave’s memory
that crosses the CPU boundary, and blocks any other software
in the system, including OS and hypervisor, from accessing
enclave code and data. Nevertheless, as protected as they might
be, enclaves do not execute in isolation. Enclaves share re-
sources with other applications in the same system, particularly
memory and CPU time. By design, SGX leaves the (considered
malicious) OS in charge of managing these resources.
However, whenever shared resources are involved, so are
side-channels. Researchers were quick to point out this short-
coming of SGX [5], [10], [17], [39], [60], casting a shadow
of doubt into enclaves’ ability to provide confidentiality,
one of the core TEE goals. Intel acknowledged the problem
but shifted the burden of protecting against side-channels to
enclave developers [29]. Curbing side-channels is not trivial,
and in the case of SGX, it is particularly challenging due to
the role the OS plays. To manage the system resources, the
OS is responsible for the enclave scheduling, memory paging,
and interrupts and exceptions handling, to name a few. These
OS capabilities, which the attacker controls, decrease the noise
of traditional side-channel attacks [5], [34] and enable new
types of side-channels, called controlled-channel attacks [60].
The first controlled-channel attacks allowed the adversary
to observe enclave accesses at page granularity (4 KiB) with-
out any noise, by merely abusing memory paging. Revoking
permissions to the enclave’s pages leads to page-faults, which
in turn give the OS attacker a trace of every page the enclave
accesses. Initial defenses that focused on detecting an abnor-
mal number of page-faults [50] just prompted the emergence of
stealthier attacks that do not rely on faults [7], [57]. In response
to these attacks, Intel officially recommends SGX developers
to place specific data and code within a page [27]. Controlled
channels, however, do not stop at the page boundary. OS ca-
pabilities can be used to enhance cache attacks [5], [17], [39],
and to extract enough information from the branch prediction
unit (BPU) to give the attacker a branch granularity view of
the victim [13], [25], [34]. As this undermines defenses against
paging-based controlled channels, further defenses leveraging
the coarse timing resolution of the attacker and the inability
of BPU attacks to leak unconditional branches were pro-
posed [34]. Nemesis [56] later showed that it is possible to time
each instruction through interrupts, invalidating the assump-
tions on the best temporal resolution available to the attacker.
Therefore, successive defenses [24] relied upon randomizing
control-flow through unconditional jumps to protect enclaves.
The current understanding of the attacker’s capabilities
leaves the impression that as long as branches do not have
observable timing differences, do not leave a different cache
trace, and BPU attacks are prevented, controlled channels can
be contained. As shown in the snippet of code in Listing 1,
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static int mpi_montmul( ... ) {
...
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, N ) >= 0 )
mpi_sub_hlp( n, N->p, A->p );
else
/* prevent timing attacks */
mpi_sub_hlp( n, A->p, T->p );
return( 0 );
}
Listing 1. Protection against timing attacks in the latest version (v2.16.6 at
the time of writing) of MbedTLS. The library balances branches by having
symmetric execution paths.
even wildly used crypto libraries tend to use balanced
branches1 to “prevent timing attacks.” This might seem
reasonable; after all, the branches in Listing 1 would neither
be observable with page attacks, since the same function is
called on both paths, nor with Nemesis as both paths have
the same instructions. We question this last line of defense,
by increasing the resolution of the attacker once more, and
demonstrating that virtually any code with control-flow secret
dependencies leaks information in SGX.
Frontal attack: We show, for the first time, that when fre-
quently interrupted, the frontend of the CPU, and in particular
its fetch and pre-decode module, lead to execution time differ-
ences related to an instruction’s virtual address. Based on this
observation, we construct a new attack on Intel’s SGX that we
call the Frontal attack. Our attack allows an attacker to asso-
ciate the measured instruction execution time with the align-
ment in the fetch window, and thus with the instructions virtual
address. These leaked execution times and addresses can then
be used by the attacker to infer control-flow and, therefore,
branch-dependent secrets, or when combined with other attacks
like Nemesis [56], to leak the execution trace of unknown
binaries which are dynamically-loaded into SGX enclaves.
We focus on extracting branch-dependent secrets and show
that an adversary can distinguish between two code sequences
executed within SGX and hence derive the secret branch
condition. Unlike in previous attacks [41], [56], which could
only distinguish between sequences of different instructions,
the Frontal attack allows the adversary to distinguish between
two execution sequences even if they contain identical
instructions (and even identical data). These differences are
observable even when the two snippets of code reside in the
same cache line and are thus not susceptible to cache side-
channel attacks. We show that by using the Frontal attack, the
adversary can extract the correct secret from the enclave with
overwhelming probability (> 90%). We discuss how different
libraries and defenses can be exploited using this attack: the
mbedTLS library, the Intel IPP library, and Zigzagger [34].
We validated our attack on all Intel microarchitectures since
the introduction of Intel SGX up to the latest one, Coffe Lake
Refresh, which includes hardware mitigations against various
microarchitectural attacks [6], [30], [36]. We show that the
attack works with high probability on all CPUs irrespective
of the newest microcode updates. We further discuss which
system configurations are better than others for the attacker.
For instance, unlike in most other microarchitectural attacks,
disabling hyperthreading helps the attacker.
1branches that contain the very same instructions on both execution paths
Defenses: Given the resolution achieved with our attack,
a more realistic SGX adversary model should be one that
considers the instruction pointer to be available to the attacker
at any time. Confidentiality in SGX can only be guaranteed in
this model if secret dependent branching is avoided altogether,
for instance, by if-conversion [9] or by writing code following
data-oblivious practices [26]. These defenses are effective
against any side-channel attack - including ours. However,
practically deploying them is not straightforward for two
reasons. First, general compiler transformations incur in
high-performance overheads or require developer assistance to
mark secrets [9]. Second, custom data oblivious solutions are
not trivial to develop correctly and require domain-specific
knowledge [26].
These practical challenges for data-oblivious code have
led to several spot defenses being continuously refined based
on the adversary’s capabilities. We give further proof in this
paper that they are bound to be broken whenever previous
assumptions about the attacker are challenged.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We investigate how frequent interrupts affect
instruction execution times. In particular, we show
a dependency between the observed execution times
and their alignments within the CPU fetch window.
• We introduce the Frontal attack. It leverages this
execution time-alignment dependency to attack
Intel SGX enclaves. The Frontal attack leaks fine-
grained control flow in branches containing the same
instructions, and that only span a single cacheline. It
can do so with more than 99% accuracy, depending
on the target binary.
• We show several vulnerable libraries that are
susceptible to the attack. We further test which CPUs
are vulnerable to our attack and found that all most
recent CPUs are vulnerable. Newer CPUs that include
hardware mitigations against Spectre seem to be more
vulnerable than older CPUs.
II. BACKGROUND
SGX is a novel Trusted Execution Environment technology
that introduced processor extensions, which allow for
processor-supported application isolation and attestation [10].
Software executed in SGX enclaves is isolated from all
other software running on the system, including the operating
system (OS) and the hypervisor. Enclave memory is encrypted,
and its integrity protected whenever it is moved outside the
CPU. Like in classical applications, the OS remains in charge
of managing the enclave’s memory through memory paging.
The OS is responsible for starting and scheduling enclaves but
should not be able to interfere in its execution or compromise
the integrity and confidentiality of their data. SGX further
supports attestation through which other enclaves or remote
parties can verify enclave code and establish secure channels
with enclaves. Finally, enclaves can seal data to disk using
CPU generated enclave- or developer-specific keys. SGX was
therefore designed to operate under the model of a local
adversary, who is in full control of the OS and can schedule
and interrupt the execution of enclaves.
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A. SGX-Step & Nemesis
SGX-Step [55] is an open-source framework that allows
single-stepping through the execution of SGX enclaves.
SGX-Step uses APIC timers to interrupt the enclave after
every instruction and inserts custom routines in between the
interrupt handler and the enclave resumption. It does not rely
on any adversarial capability not given in the standard Intel
SGX attacker model as interrupt handlers and APIC timers
are controlled by the OS, which is assumed to be under the
control of the adversary.
When an enclave receives an interrupt, it performs an
Asynchronous Enclave Exit (AEX) and then jumps to the
handler defined in the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) to take
care of the interrupt. After the interrupt has been handled, it
jumps to the address set in the asynchronous enclave pointer
(AEP). The function in the AEP eventually executes the
ERESUME instruction to resume the enclave [10]. SGX-Step
installs a custom interrupt handler in user-space to gain control
as soon as possible after the interrupt. It also replaces the AEP
to execute custom instructions right before ERESUME. SGX-
Step uses these modified routines to store the current cycle
count just before entering the enclave and right after an AEX.
To interrupt the enclave at the right time, it configures a cycle-
accurate APIC timer. This timer can be configured so that the
execution is interrupted after a single instruction is executed
inside the enclave. These changes allow an adversary to single-
step an enclave and measure timings of individual instructions
(including a constant offset by the ERESUME and AEX).
The Nemesis [56] attack exploits the fact that the interrupt
timings obtained through SGX-Step are correlated with the
instruction type currently pending in the CPU. Since current
processors execute some instructions faster than others, the
adversary can make an educated guess about the type of
instruction that was executed in a single step. Based on a
trace of these timings, and knowledge of the binary executing
in the enclave, the attacker can detect where the instruction
pointer (IP) was in the enclave when the interrupt was
received. Because Nemesis exploits the difference in interrupt
timings, it cannot resolve the IP whenever a balanced branch
is executed in the enclave, or even a branch with different
instructions but with instructions that yield similar timing.
B. CPU Background: The Frontend
Although the x86 instruction set architecture (ISA) is well
specified [28], the microarchitecture is typically proprietary,
and its details are confidential. Intel and AMD, however,
publish general overviews of the microarchitecture of their
current processors. Further insights into the microarchitecture
can also be obtained through the use of performance counters.
Generally, the processor core can be split into three main parts:
the frontend, the backend, and the memory subsystem. Here,
we will focus on the frontend of the processor. For further
information into the other components, we refer to [15].
The frontend of a processor is responsible for fetching and
decoding instructions into a format that the backend under-
stands. Modern Intel processors need to fetch a large number
of macro-ops to feed the extremely performant out-of-order
backend. The core fetches 16 bytes at once, from 16 bytes
aligned blocks, also called the fetch window. In x86, there is an
extra step during decoding where the fetched x86 instructions
(macro-ops) get translated to a different internal instruction
format called micro-operations (micro-ops). While the x86
ISA is well-specified [28], the internal micro-operations are
considered a competitive advantage and are kept secret. The
frontend of modern Intel processors contains three different
paths for decoding instructions into micro-ops: the legacy
decoding pipeline, the micro-op cache (also known as decoded
instruction cache), and the micro-code sequencer. The latter
is only used for very complex macro-ops that get decoded to
more than five micro-ops. Most of the Intel SGX instructions,
such as ECREATE or ERESUME, get decoded into hundreds of
micro-ops. Ordinary macro-ops can either get decoded by the
legacy decoding pipeline or hit the micro-op cache. The exact
number of micro-ops emitted from these three components is
visible through specific frontend performance counters.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE FRONTAL ATTACK
Attacker model: We consider an attacker that wants
to leak secret data from a victim SGX enclave running
on a system under her control. The victim enclave has a
control-flow dependency related to the secret data the attacker
wants to leak. The adversary operates under the standard SGX
attacker model [10]. That is, she controls the entire software
stack, including the operating system (OS), on the machine
in which the enclave executes. However, the CPU package
is not physically compromised. We assume that the secret
that the enclave holds was remotely loaded after a successful
attestation. Otherwise, if the secret would be contained in the
enclave code, it would be trivially available to the OS.
Attack overview: We introduce our attack through an
example code snippet that we show in Figure 1a (C code),
and Figure 1b (its x86 assembly version). On both branches,
the code contains the very same instructions, and writes to the
same memory addresses, albeit with different constant values.
Thus, we expect its execution time to be independent of
which branch is taken, and hence not to have any correlation
with the “secret” input.
However, our attack shows that, when the above sequence
is run within an SGX enclave, a local attacker can learn which
branch was taken, and therefore derive the secret value of the
branch condition. Our attack leverages two main observations.
First, even if the branches have the same instructions, they are
often differently aligned within the fetch windows (Listing 1b)
– in our experiments, this alone did not produce observable
differences in the execution times (cf. Section IV). Second, if
the execution of both branches is frequently interrupted, the
difference in their alignments w.r.t. the fetch windows will
cause the CPU to fetch instructions at different times (Table I),
resulting in a measurable difference in the execution times of
the instructions and therefore of branches (cf. Section IV).
To give an intuition on why interrupts lead to a successful
attack, we show which instructions are fetched by the CPU
when the execution is interrupted after each instruction. There
are two main factors to consider: which instructions among
those already in the pipeline are retired when an interrupt is
received, and how execution is resumed after an interrupt. Intel
guarantees that only the first pending instruction in the reorder
buffer is completed before the interrupt is handled [55]. In
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if (secret == ’a’) {
var1 = 1 + var1;
var2 = 1 + var2;
} else {
var1 = 2 + var1;
var2 = 2 + var2;
}
return;
H
(a) Secret dependent branch
0x3: mov (var1), %
0x8: mov (var2), %
0xc: cmp (secret), ’a’
0xe: jnz .else
0x10: add $1, %
0x14: mov %
0x19: add $1, %
0x1d: mov %
0x22: ret
...
.else:
0x2b: add $2, %
0x2f: mov %
0x34: add $2, %
0x38: mov %
0x3d: ret
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(b) Secret dependent branch in asm
Fig. 1. A secret-dependent branch in C and x86 assembly. Note that both
branches in the assembly code fit within the same cacheline (64B). We give
the virtual address of the instructions on the left. Fetch windows are 16B
long and start at addresses divisible by 16.
TABLE I. IN THIS TABLE WE SHOW HOW
INSTRUCTIONS ARE BATCHED INTO FETCH WINDOWS WHEN THE ENCLAVE
RESUMES EXECUTION, ACCORDING TO WHICH BRANCH IS EXECUTING.
IF AN INSTRUCTION CROSSES A FETCH WINDOW BOUNDARY, WE ASSUME
IT IS DECODED TOGETHER WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE FOLLOWING
WINDOW. THE INTERRUPTS REFER TO THE INSTRUCTIONS IN FIGURE 1B.
If Else
Int #1 add mov add add
Int #2 mov add mov add mov ret
Int #3 add add mov ret
Int #4 mov ret mov ret
out-of-order processors, other instructions might already have
been executed, but none of these will be retired. The CPU
architecturally commits2 only the next pending instruction
in program order. To resume execution after the interrupt is
handled, the CPU needs to fetch the instruction after the last
one retired. As fetch windows are statically aligned at 16
Bytes code blocks [15], the instruction committed during the
interrupt will be fetched again but will have to be discarded
by the frontend (unless it was the last one of a 16 Byte
code block). Alignment w.r.t. fetch windows can, therefore,
change which instructions are forwarded to other stages of
the CPU, and ultimately populate the pipeline. To help clarify
this point, for both branches of our example code, we show
in Table I which instructions are fetched after every interrupt.
In principle, differences in the alignment of instructions in a
fetch window should not cause any difference in the execution
time of one instruction, as the same instructions will be even-
tually executed on both branches. However, we experimentally
observe that depending on the alignment within a fetch window
and the number and type of instructions present around them,
some instructions consistently take longer to execute than
others. In Section IV, we provide more details on which
alignments of instructions produce measurable execution time
2Or discards, if it raises an exception
differences. This observation hence allows us to associate the
measured instruction execution time with the alignment in
the fetch window, and therefore with the instruction virtual
address (i.e., with the instruction pointer). These leaked exe-
cution times and addresses can then be used to infer executed
branches (e.g., when they depend on the secret value) or,
when combined with other attacks [56], to leak the execution
trace (including fine-grained control flow) of unknown binaries
which are dynamically-loaded into the SGX enclave.
In this work, we focus on the use of our attack in the
context of secret-dependent branching. In particular, for the
scenario given above in Table I when enough mov are fetched
after a mov in the branch, the interrupt latency is measurably
different. In our example, we measured interrupt #2 in the
table to be faster if the code is executing in the “else” branch,
as compared to the “if” branch, despite the fact that we are
interrupting the same instruction under the exact same system
conditions.
Let’s consider again Listing 1b. By running an SGX-Step
attack, we can get the timing of each instruction, stepping
through them one by one. This, by itself, will not allow
to differentiate which path of the branch was taken, as the
branches are perfectly balanced. However, because of the
observations made above, we will observe two scenarios
for the 6th instruction measured, which is the instruction at
address 0x14 or 0x2f, depending on the secret value. If the
interrupt is “slow”, we must be executing the mov at address
0x14. Conversely, if the interrupt is “fast”, we must be
executing the mov at address 0x30. Since the control flow of
the program depends on the secret, this allows us to recover
its value, and hence break the SGX confidentiality guarantees.
The snippet presented in Figure 1 produces distinguishable
timing for the first mov instruction inside the branch. We were
able to use the timing difference to predict the secret with
≥ 65% accuracy. With three more movs after the branches
(which are executed by both paths), we were able to obtain
success rates > 90%. The attack presented above illustrates
how fully balanced branches actually produce secret dependent
timings when interrupted frequently. Given that this side-
channel is due to the design and behavior of the CPU Frontend,
we name our attack the Frontal attack. In the following
Sections, we will analyze the Frontal attack in more detail.
IV. FRONTAL ATTACK PROFILING
In this section, we provide more details and clarifications
that help in understanding under which circumstances the
Frontal Attack works. More specifically, we ask and answer
the following questions: (i) are the interrupts required for
the attack to be successful? (ii) what are the effects of fetch
window alignment / instruction address on the attack? and (iii)
which instructions produce observable timing differences?
To answer these question we perform experiments over the
code snippet shown in Figure 2. Similar to code in Figure 1,
this code snippet contains two perfectly symmetric branches,
and the branch to be taken depends on a secret. It still consists
of two perfectly balanced branches but differs in that now
each branch contains 25 sequences of add-mov instructions.
We chose this longer code sequence since it produces timing
differences which are more clearly above the noise floor than
4
.align (x - 0x4)
x - 0x4: cmp (secret), 1
x - 0x2: jnz .else
.if:
.rept 25
x + 0x0: add %
x + 0x3: mov %
.endr
x + 0x190: ret
...
.align y
.else:
.rept 25
y + 0x0: add %
y + 0x3: mov %
.endr
y + 0x190: ret
Fig. 2. ASM Code with high attack success probability, which we use to
profile the attack. The .rept 25 ... .endr assembler directive repeats
the instructions within the block 25 times, leading to an address of x+0x190
for the ret instruction.
the code in Figure 1 and therefore better illustrates timing and
alignment effects under different experiment configurations.
Namely, code sequences that include several mov instructions
like the one in Figure 2 are particularly susceptible to the
Frontal attack and allow us to extract the correct branch (i.e.,
branch condition secret) with over 99% accuracy, whereas
with shorter sequences which contain few movs (like the one
in Figure 1) this accuracy drops to ≥ 65%. We discuss this
effect in more detail later in this section.
A. Are the interrupts required for the attack to be successful?
To analyze the effect of frequent interrupts on the
behavior of the processor we measure the execution time of
our test code snippet (Figure 2) with and without interrupts.
Both branches of this code are identical, however, like in our
previous example, the fetch windows for these branches differ.
1) Outside SGX without interrupts: We first measured the
overall execution time of the code snippet outside SGX without
interrupts. We executed the code with two billion independent
random inputs, and we observed no significant correlation
between execution times and the branch that was executed
(Pearson’s coefficient = −2.51 · 10−5). An approximate
distribution of this measurement is shown in Figure 3.
2) In SGX without interrupts: In order to exclude any
effect due to SGX, we further measure the overall execution
time of the code within an SGX enclave, again without
interrupts. Note that SGX does not provide any way to get
a precise timer (cf. Section II), so we have to measure the
execution time from the untrusted app.
We perform this measurement in three different ways. First,
we measure the time needed to do a function call of an enclave
containing the code under measurement. This time is collected
by the untrusted app by getting the clock count right before the
enclave call and comparing it to the value obtained as soon as
the enclave returns. We repeat this measurement in a loop from
the untrusted app to account for noise in the measurement.
Second, we ran a loop inside the enclave, which calls the
code under measurement in each iteration. Before and after the
function call the enclave performs an ocall to the untrusted
app. This lets the untrusted app know when an iteration started
and terminated, and gives it the opportunity to collect the CPU
Fig. 3. Distribution of the overall execution time of the branch in Figure 2
when run outside of SGX without interrupts with 2 billion samples.
time stamp counter. Third, we use a similar setup as the second
method, but instead of performing ocalls, the enclave sam-
ples the value of a counter stored in shared memory. A thread
of the untrusted app is incrementing the counter in a loop, thus
simulating the time stamp counter, albeit at a lower precision.
All three methods use a independent uniform random value as
the “secret” given to the code at each iteration.
In all three cases, similar to the experiment outside of SGX,
we observed no significant correlation (Pearson’s coefficient
≈ 10−2 with 106 runs) between the execution time and the
secret provided to the enclave (e.g., the branch that was taken).
This experiment confirmed that when the code is executed
within SGX, both branches execute in the same, constant time.
3) In SGX with interrupts: We now investigate which
effects frequent interrupts have on the execution timing of
the code. We execute the same code but we interrupt it after
each instruction. Upon each interrupt the CPU performs an
asynchronous enclave exit (AEX), handles the interrupt, and
then performs an ERESUME to resume the enclave execution.
Such an experiment would normally require very fast and
extremely precise interrupts, which is usually hard to achieve.
However, in the case of a victim code running within SGX, we
can use SGX-Step [55] to single step through each instruction
and collect its execution time. Given these interrupts, we can
not only measure the overall execution time, but also the
execution time of each instruction. This means that in each
run of our code, we obtain 51 measurements3.
We then analyzed whether any of the 51 measured
instruction execution times correlates with the executed
branch. We observed a strong correlation between the
timings of most of the instructions and the branch they belong
to. The first 10 mov instructions in the branch turned out to
be a stronger indicator of which branch was taken, but all
the other instructions belonging to the branch showed some
correlation, albeit a weaker one4.
Like in Section III, we observed the execution time of the
first mov in each branch to be faster or slower, depending on
the branch they belong to, with the difference between them
being around 100 cycles. As we will show in the following
subsections, this effect will also be visible on other mov
instructions as well as on other instructions in the code, and
3There are 52 instruction in Figure 2, however the first cmp and jnz get
macro-fused into one instruction which cannot be split again by interrupts.
4Only the execution times of instructions in the branches correlated with
the branches. The timings of the initial cmp and jnz instructions were
independent of the executed branch.
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will depend on the instruction alignment within the fetch
window (i.e., instruction address).
This observation allowed us to set a timing threshold based
on which we could, with up to 99.9% accuracy, determine
which branch was taken, and therefore determine the secret
value in the branch condition.
We stress again that the two branches are instruction-wise
identical: the instructions they contain and their inputs are the
same. This is especially important because it highlights the
fact that the timing difference is due to the way the instructions
are executed, and not some external system state. For instance,
the difference cannot be due to the state of the cache, the
state of the branch predictor, or in general to some speculation
decisions made by the CPU. If the cause of the differences
were to be due to any of these factors, we would expect two
key differences. First, as we choose secrets at random, these
effects would manifest with equal probability in any of the
two branches. Second, we would expect the experiments in
which we do not interrupt the code also to show some bias.
However, we see a clear bias in one of the two branches, and
the interrupt-free runs showed no correlation with the branch.
Observation 1: When code execution is frequently
interrupted, the execution times of selected instructions
depend on their location in the victim binary and
therefore on their virtual memory address.
B. What are the effects of fetch window alignment / instruction
address on the attack?
While the instructions in both branches are identical, there
is one key difference between them: their virtual address.
Therefore, we analyze what virtual addresses make the two
branches distinguishable when frequently interrupted, and
to what degree. In particular, as discussed in Section III,
we also study the relationship between the alignment of the
branches with respect to the fetch window and what role,
if any, this plays into the success of the attack. As can be
seen in Figure 2, we use the align compiler directive to
explicitly align each branch to a given address. With .align
X we indicate that the code following the directive starts at
the next virtual address whose lower bits are equal to X5. For
example, if X = 3 and Y = 2, then the if branch will start
at address 0x13 and end at address 0x1a3, while the else
branch will start at address 0x1b2.
To evaluate different alignments, we run an experiment to
test if different values of X and Y in Figure 2 have any effect
on the observed timing differences. We repeat the interrupt
experiment described at the end of Section IV-A. That is, we
send an interrupt to each instruction and then use the interrupt
timing of one of the instructions in the branch as a discrim-
inator to determine which branch was taken. We calculate
the attack success as the percentage of how many times we
identified the correct branch. Therefore, the attack success rate
will tell us how good a certain combination of the alignments
X and Y are for the attack. The higher the percentage the
better a combination is for the attack, while a result close
to 50% indicates that telling which branch was taken is as
5This is equivalent to combining the two gcc asm directives .align
(X//2n) and .space (X%2n) (for the biggest n such that 2n < X)
Fig. 4. Attack success rate depending on the alignment of the branches. The
attack success rate is the percentage of correctly guessed branches by the
attacker out of 1000 executed branches. The 10th instruction (5th mov) from
Figure 2 is used to distinguish between both branches. The color gradient
goes from red to yellow, where red boxes indicate higher attack success rates
(up to 100%) and yellow ones lower success rates (down to 50%).
good as a random guess. We collect these percentages for
each combination of {X,Y } ∈ [0, 31]2 by running the code
in Figure 2 1000 times with independently distributed uniform
random secrets. We compare use timings collected for the 10th
instruction (5th mov) in the timing trace. Figure 4 presents the
result of our experiment. These results show clear dependency
between virtual addresses and the instruction execution times.
1) Alignment: Given this, we can further draw a
dependency between the virtual address of the two branches
and the attack success, as some virtual address pairs
consistently result in higher attack success rate than others.
2) Modulo 16: There are four main quadrants of length
16 that are essentially identical. This hints at the fact that the
behavior with respect to the alignment of the two branches re-
peats every 16 bytes. We verified this assumption by repeating
the experiment for every value of X and Y for which X = Y
mod 16, and for which the two branches are still contained
in the same 4 kB virtual page6. We observed the same pattern
for all values. As a consequence of this observation, when
we use the term alignment, we refer to alignment modulo 16.
Observation 2.1: The attack success rate depends on
the alignment modulo 16 of the two branches.
3) Diagonals: The attack success rate on the diagonals in
each quadrant is around 50%. In the diagonals, both branches
are aligned to the same value X = Y mod 16, which shows
that only differently aligned branches (modulo 16) exhibit a
timing difference.
Observation 2.2: Branches and instructions with the
same alignment will show the same execution times.
6We did not cross the virtual page boundary because this would most
likely require fetching pages that are not cached, thus introducing noise that
masks the effects we are interested in measuring here.
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Fig. 5. Timing distribution of 100,000 movs.
4) Symmetry: The fourth observation emerges when
looking at each of these quadrants: The attack success rates
are symmetric with respect to their diagonal. Meaning that
the success of the attack when the “if” branch is aligned at
address X and the “else” branch at address Y is the same
when the alignment of the branches is switched.
Observation 2.3: Alignments X,Y and Y,X produce
the same attack success rate.
5) Shape: Finally, we focus our attention to the alignments
in the heatmap in which the success rate is above 70%.
As it can be observed, these success rates are grouped
into rectangles. Within each of these rectangles, there are
three regions of decreasing intensity. The most interesting
alignments are the ones that give the higher attack success
rates, as they allow to optimize the accuracy of the attack. The
best results are concentrated on rectangles of size 3× 5. This
corresponds with the length in bytes of the two instructions
within the branch in Figure 2. The add instruction has a length
of 3B, while the mov we use in Figure 2 has a length of 5B.
We will explore further the relation between the length of the
instructions in the branch and the distributions of the attack
success rate within the alignment in the subsection below.
Note that there are only a few structures in the CPU
that are sensitive to the alignment of the instruction, and in
particular, to their alignment modulo 16. On Skylake and
Coffee Lake architectures, this is the instruction pre-decode
and fetch module in the front-end of the CPU, which uses
a fetch window of 16 bytes to fetch instruction from the
L1 instruction cache. We cannot be entirely sure about the
internal behavior of the CPU and what leads to the timing
differences in the two branches. However, as discussed
in Section III, the different alignment changes the way
instructions are batched by the front-end and, ultimately, the
timing at which they are delivered to the subsequent stages of
the CPUs. The experiments presented in this section strongly
suggest that these fetching differences have repercussions for
the instruction’s execution timing. We will discuss potential
causes within the CPU that could be causing the same
instruction to execute at variable timings in Section VII-A.
C. The effects of instruction alignment
To study the effects of the instruction alignment we
analyze the timing distributions of a linear code sequence
of repeating add-mov, which we fix to 100,000. Note that
this is essentially an unrolled loop, which compared to a
loop removes the noise that the looping instructions would
introduce. We don’t envision any real code to have this many
repeating instructions, but by exploring the patterns that
emerge from these instructions we can gather several insights
about how the differences in branch alignments manifest.
We recall that the timings are collected using a slightly
modified version of SGX-Step, whose changes are described
in Appendix C. As in SGX-Step, the timings for each
instruction include: the time to perform ERESUME, the
time to execute the instruction, and the time required to
perform AEX. ERESUME, and AEX prepare the CPU for the
enclave execution and clean the state when returning to the
untrusted app. These operations take thousands of CPU cycles
to complete, and this is why, despite the fact that we are
measuring a single instruction, the latency reported in the
graphs are in the order of thousands of cycles. We use two
figures to illustrate different aspects of the timing latency
of the same run: (i) Figure 5 depicts the overall latency
distribution of all the movs, and (ii) Figure 6 the distribution
separated by particular virtual addresses. The analysis of these
plots further allows us to discuss a third point: (iii) how these
distributions are influenced by the surrounding instructions.
1) Distribution of instruction execution times: In the first
graph, in Figure 5 we present the histogram of the instruction
execution times, for one run, of all 100,000 executed mov.
The most evident feature of this distribution is that it
consists of two Gaussian distributions. The movs are therefore
exhibiting two different behaviors, whose distributions are,
on average, around 100 cycles apart.
Observation 3.1: There are two very distinguishable
behaviors of movs: fast and slow. The slow movs are, on
average, around 100 cycles slower than the fast ones.
In general, we observed similar results with other
instructions that access memory, such as add to memory. We
remark here that these differences are not due to the state of the
L1 data-cache. We ensure this by running the victim enclave on
a dedicated physical core in the system and by always perform-
ing the same operations while handling interrupts. We further
verified with the OFFCORE_REQUESTS_ALL_REQUESTS
performance counter that no extra off-core memory
transactions were being performed by the slower memory
writes compared to the faster ones.
Observation 3.2: Observation 3.1 applies not only to
movs but to all memory writes.
2) Instruction execution times by alignment: Regarding
alignment, there is an important characteristic of the chosen
instruction sequence that has not been considered in our
analysis thus far. Each couple of add-mov in the sequence
has a length of 8B, which is a multiple of 16. This implies that
the movs can only be aligned in two different ways modulo
16. In general, by testing the sequence with different initial
offsets, we observed movs at addresses between 1 and 8 to
be predominately slow and movs at addresses 9 to 16 to be
predominately fast. We highlight that the two alignments are
only predominately fast or slow, and they exhibit timings from
both behaviors, with each alignment displaying a different
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Fig. 6. Timing distribution of 100,000 movs split by their alignment.
intensity of the weaker one. Figure 6 shows this phenomenon
for two particular alignments (0x6 and 0xe). As can be seen
alignment 0x6 is predominately slow, but exhibits some fast
timings as well. The plots for other alignments are similar,
with the only thing changing being the size of the smaller
peaks. We do not show them here due to space constraints.
Observation 3.3: The alignment of the memory writes
determines how their latency will distribute between
the fast and slow behaviors.
If one branch is aligned such that the measured mov
produces predominantly fast latency, and the other is aligned
to produce predominantly slow latency then the branches
are easily distinguishable, and a high success rate will be
observed. If one of them has a non negligible weaker peak,
like the small blue peak in figure 6, then one bit can be
distinguished with high accuracy, but the other will contain
some errors. If both branches have non negligible weaker
peaks, both branches will be on average guessed better than
random, but will also contain errors. And finally if both
branches have similar predominant and weaker behaviors the
success rate of the attacker will be negligible.
D. Which instructions produce observable timing differences?
Given the timing differences observed thus far, the
question that we ask in this subsection is which instructions
are more useful than others at revealing timing differences.
Knowing which instructions produce a clearer signal allows
the attacker to identify which parts of a vulnerable code are
better suited as targets for the attack.
To address this point, we briefly describe what influences
the shape of the weaker behaviors displayed in Figure 6. We
experimentally observed that the alignment of surrounding
memory writes is the key factor in determining the shape
of the weak peaks. Among them, subsequent memory writes
have a bigger effect than proceeding ones when determining
the distribution of a target instruction. We analyze three cases
in this regard: (i) all movs with the same alignment (modulo
16) across a measured trace, (ii) movs alternating between
two alignments, and (iii) a trace with movs covering every
possible alignment. Case (i) exhibits only a fast distribution,
irrespective of the initial offset. Case (ii) is what we analyzed
above, and depending on the alignment, we know it exhibits
either a stronger fast behavior, and a weaker slow one, or
vice-versa. Finally, case (iii) produces almost all combinations
of behaviors depending on the alignment under measurement.
Fig. 7. Structure of a victim branch for the frontal attack.
Some alignment behaves like case (ii), others are only fast,
others only slow, and finally some are equally randomly
distributed between the two behaviors.
Observation 3.4: The timing distribution of a
memory write is not only determined by its alignment
in isolation, but its intensity across the fast and
slow behavior is also influenced by the number and
alignment of surrounding memory instructions.
V. FRONTAL ATTACK EXPLOITATION
A. Finding gadgets
The initial phase of the attack consists of identifying
which branches of a victim enclave the attacker can target. An
exploitable branch needs to be secret-dependent and properly
aligned. Branches that are secret dependent can be found
by static analysis, through manual inspection of the binary,
and if possible dynamically, by running the victim enclave in
debug mode with different inputs and comparing the resulting
execution traces. Several tools that automatically perform
these steps, have already been proposed, e.g., DATA [58]
and Microwalk [59].Note that if these branches are not
balanced, i.e., they contain a different number or different
kind of instructions they are already vulnerable to a Nemesis
attack [56]. However, if they are balanced, that is they contain
the same number and types of instruction, they would not be
vulnerable to Nemesis, but are vulnerable to the Frontal attack.
Identifying gadgets requires access to the victim binary.
This requirement is not met if the target enclave loads its code
dynamically at run-time. As hinted in Section III, the Frontal
attack could be used in combination with Nemesis [56] to
de-obfuscate a dynamically loaded binary. However, we do
not explore this scenario in this paper, and simply assume
that the attacker has access to the binary.
1) Optimizing Gadgets: Figure 7 summarizes different
parts of a secret dependent branch that are relevant for the
success of the frontal attack. There are four main elements in
the figure that contribute to the attack success rate, in order of
importance these are: the alignment of the two branches, the
instructions in the branches, the post-branch instructions, and
the pre-branch instructions. We use the observations made in
Section IV to evaluate these factors.
First, we know that only specific alignments produce
observable differences. Memory writes aligned at addresses
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1-8 show different predominant behaviors than writes aligned
at addresses 9-16 modulo 16 (cf. Section IV-C2). Therefore,
better results can be expected if the victim branches happen
to have memory writes aligned at those addresses. Second,
memory writes inside of the branch produce better timing
differences (Observations 3.1 and 3.2) therefore, the attacker
should prefer branches that contain at least one of them. The
more memory writes are in the branch the easier it will be for
the attacker to exploit it, as this increases the likelihood that
one of them will be at an address (modulo 16) with a strong
timing bias. However, the presence of memory writes in the
branch instructions is not a hard requirement, as we were able
to observe some biases even on branches that did not contain
any memory writes. It is sufficient that memory operations
are used as pre and post-branch instructions. Finally, branches
that have pre or post-branch memory operations have more
distinguishable timing differences (observation 3.4). This is
particularly relevant when only few memory writes (e.g., only
one) are present in the branch instructions.
We found that the best approach is first to use taint
analysis to find all the vulnerable branches, and then use the
runtime measurements of these branches to detect whether
they are vulnerable or not, as described in the following.
2) Branch execution: Secrets are usually provided to
enclaves from a remote verifier at run-time, after he has
attested and established a secure channel with a legitimate
enclave. We consider two particular cases for the attacker:
the first, in which the remote verifier will provision the secret
an unlimited amount of times, and the second, and most
restrictive one, in which the remote verifier will provision the
secret only once and the enclave only executes the branch
once. We start describing the first (and simpler) case, and then
describe what techniques the attacker can use to maximize
her success rate when the target branch is executed only once.
If the same secret is provisioned to the enclave multiple
times, she can correlate the timings of multiple runs of the
same branch to reduce the noise, and increase her confidence
in the result. However, naively combining all the timing
measurements, won’t help. As we describe in Appendix C,
the timings of the same instructions for different runs have
different means, and hence are shifted by a variable amount
each time an enclave is re-initialized. Without accounting for
these variations, correlating timing across different enclaves
runs is thus problematic. However, the results can still be
combined by guessing which branch was taken independently
for each run, and then using majority voting for the final
guess. This increases the attack success rate and allows to
make an accurate guess even for target branches that give an
otherwise low advantage to the attacker.
Different means for the measurements across enclave
creations make it hard to attack an enclave when the secret is
only one bit, and hence the branch gets executed only once.
In this case, the attacker can only observe the timing of one of
the two branches, and has no comparison point from the other
branch. Note that because of the differences in timings across
runs, the adversary can only classify branches by observing
which instructions were faster than others in the same run. To
compensate for this effect, we can use Observation 3.3, and,
before the branch is executed (or after), collect the timings of
instructions that have the same alignments as the instructions
in the branches. This gives the attacker comparison points,
and allows her to distinguish even within branches that are
only executed once.
Finally, we discuss the extreme case in which the secret
is provisioned only once. As compared to the previous case,
the target branch will be executed only in one run, and hence
the attacker can’t correlate the results from different measure-
ments. However, she can still use the technique discussed for
the one bit secret to get more measurements about the target
branches, albeit from instructions that do not belong to them.
B. Measurement and Analysis
There are three main factors to consider in the measurement
phase of the attack. First, how many times the secret is going
to be provisioned and how many times the target branch is
going to be run. Second, how to deduce from the timing
distributions which branch was taken. Finally, the environment
in which the target enclave is running, this includes the specific
system setup.
After collecting the measurements the attacker needs a
strategy to assign those measurements to the branches to which
they belong to. This strategy depends on what kind of bias the
branch under measurement was showing. Exploitable branches
show two behaviors (cf. Observation 3.1). Their exact distribu-
tions across these two behaviors determines the best strategy
for the attacker. Note that, as described before, the attacker
can obtain these distributions by running and profiling specific
victim branches beforehand. This might require profiling on a
copy of enclave binary which contains only the target branches
if, for instance, the real enclave only receives the secret once.
After the target branch has been profiled, the timing
analysis consists in assigning the run-time measurements to
each of the two behavior classes. Given several measurements
for branches (in the same run) a linear separator can usually
be defined between the two behaviors, alternatively clustering
algorithms can also be employed at this stage. Depending
on the bias of the branches, the attacker can then make
different conclusions from these classifications. Let’s take
as an example the results of Figure 6. Every measurement
classified as slow belongs comes from the blue distribution
with high probability. However, there is more uncertainty
about the measurements classified as fast. In this case the
attacker might choose to classify only the bits that he has
a high confidence of and brute force the remaining ones. In
most cases, looking at only one instruction in the branch is
sufficient. However, if available, correlating measurements
of multiple instructions in the branches can increase the
confidence of the attacker for a particular guess.
1) System setup: The success rate of the frontal attack can
be influenced by the system in which it is run. In particular,
whether simultaneous multi-threading (SMT) is enabled, the
system’s CPU model, and its microcode version. While SMT
was enabled and the virtual core co-located with the victim
enclave’s core was executing another binary, we were unable to
reproduce the timings observed in Section IV. In general, the
frontal attack is more reliable if SMT is disabled or the virtual
core co-located with the victim is not executing anything. This
is most likely due to the way in which the front-end handles
and fetches instructions coming from different virtual cores.
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num mont_mult(num A, num B, num R, num N) {
...
if (result >= N)
result = result - N;
return result;
}
Listing 2. Secret dependent branch at the end of the Montgomery Modular
Multiplication.
num mont_ladder(num x, num n, int k) {
r0 = x; r1 = x*x;
for (int i = k-1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (n[i] == 0)
r1 = r0 * r1; r0 = r0 * r0;
else
r0 = r0 * r1; r1 = r1 * r1;
}
return r0;
}
Listing 3. Montgomery Ladder. It contains a secret dependent balanced
branch.
With the newest microcode, or CPUs without hardware
mitigations for Spectre produce noisier results than CPUs
with hardware mitigations for it. We give more details about
the affected CPUs and microcode versions in Section VI.
However, we noticed that the noise in the old CPUs completely
disappears in some runs of the enclave. Since the attacker can
profile key instructions of the victim enclave before the secret
is provisioned, she can assert whether the current run is noisy
or not. The attacker can collect the timings from a mov at dif-
ferent alignments and verify that the two behaviors are present
and are clearly separated (e.g., 100 cycles apart on average cf.
Observation 3.1). The adversary can then restart the enclave
until a noise-free run is detected, and only then allow the secret
to be provisioned. With this technique the adversary can also
exploit older CPUs with the newest microcode updates.
C. Vulnerable Code
1) Montgomery Modular Multiplication: Montgomery
modular multiplication is a fast modular multiplication algo-
rithm and it is often used in cryptographic libraries due to its
speed and minimal secret dependence. There is only a single
secret dependent branch in the algorithm at the end, depicted in
Listing 2. Some implementations just balance the branches by
adding an else branch with a dummy subtraction. However, this
naive mitigation is still vulnerable to side-channel attacks that
target control flow, such as the Frontal attack. We found such
an implementation in the mbedTLS v2.16.6 library [35] where
it is used in the sliding window exponentiation. This informa-
tion can be used to extract some bits of the secret key [34].
2) Montgomery Ladder: The Montgomery Ladder is a
well-known algorithm to calculate the exponentiation xn and
it is widely used for elliptic curve cryptography due to its
speed and side-channel resistance. Listing 3 shows a naive
implementation that tries to mitigate side-channel attacks by
branch balancing. The depicted implementation is vulnerable
to control flow side-channel attacks such as the Frontal attack
(and potentially also to data access side-channel attacks).
3) Zigzagger: Zigzagger [34] is a software mitigation
technique against side-channel attacks that leak the instruction
pointer by targeting the branch predictor state. The mitigation
replaces all branches with multiple indirect jumps. These
TABLE II. LIST OF ALL THE PROCESSORS WE TESTED WITH THEIR
RESPECTIVE MICROCODE VERSION AND MITIGATION AGAINST KNOWN
MICROARCHITECURAL ATTACKS SUCH AS SPECTRE AND FORESHADOW.
Processor µarch Launched µcode Mitig. Vulnerable
i7-6700HQ Skylake Q3’15 0xc2 µcode yes†
i7-6700HQ Skylake Q3’15 0xd6 µcode yes†
i7-7700 Kaby Lake Q1’17 0x48 - yes
i7-7700 Kaby Lake Q1’17 0x8e µcode yes†
i7-9700K C. Lake R Q4’18 0xb8 HW yes
i7-9700K C. Lake R Q4’18 0xca HW yes
i9-9900KS C. Lake R Q4’19 0xb8 HW yes
i9-9900KS C. Lake R Q4’19 0xca HW yes
Xeon E-2278G C. Lake R Q2’19 0xb8 HW yes
Xeon E-2278G C. Lake R Q2’19 0xca HW yes
†: Only vulnerable in some runs (see Figure 8)
jumps modify the state of the branch predictor such that the
adversary will only leak garbled data. The Frontal attack does
not rely on the state of the branch predictor, and therefore, can
still attack binaries that were protected with it. Nemesis [56]
already showed that Zigzagger can be broken when the
branches it protects are unbalanced, the frontal attack extends
this to balanced branches.
4) Intel IPP Library: Several secret dependent branches
were already known to be present in the Intel IPP library and
can be targeted by the Frontal attack. For instance, in [59], six
critical functions with secret dependent branches were identi-
fied.These functions are related to cryptographic computation
and can therefore leak some secrets bits from enclaves using
the library. Through manual inspection of the most recent
version of the library (2.9 at the time of writing) we also found
the following functions to have secret-dependent branches:
l9_cpNLZ_BNU, l9_cpDiv_BNU32, l9_ippsCmp_BN
(and basically every other big number equality comparator in
the library). The branches in l9_cpNLZ_BNU can be used
to leak part of the 64 most significant bits of two numbers
being multiplied by the library. The branches and loops in
l9_cpDiv_BNU32 leak some bits of two numbers being di-
vided with each other. Finally, l9_ippsCmp_BN is a function
which compares two big numbers by iterating through each of
their bytes one by one. At the end of the loop it executes a
balanced branch to determine which number was bigger, and
then it writes back the result to a location in memory. This
function is particularly interesting because the binary suggests
that the main loop and branches were purposely aligned to fit
within a cache line, but the function is still vulnerable to the
frontal attack. We believe, because of the that the branches in
their binary are aligned, that they could be used to leak some
bits of the secret data they operate on. In their response (cf. Ap-
pendix A) Intel specified that these functions are not used for
secret dependent computation in their architectural enclaves.
VI. AFFECTED PROCESSORS
During our experiments, we noticed that microcode
versions affect the timings that are exploited in the Frontal
attack. We observed each microcode update to increase the
number of cycles for an AEX and an EERESUME. We
speculate that these are side effects of the added mitigations
against microarchitectural attacks such as spectre [30] and
foreshadow [6]. While we would like to test each public
microcode available for each CPU, the oldest microcode
version available to us was limited by two factors. First, the
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Fig. 8. The attack success rate over 500 runs each with 1000 samples for
different microcode versions of the Intel Core i7-7700 processor (alignment:
X = 6, Y = 2).
microcode version already present in the CPU cannot be
downgraded. Second, the BIOS of the mainboard provides the
minimum microcode version to the CPU during early boot.
We tested five different processors from the 6th generation
that introduced Intel SGX up to the 9th with hardware
mitigations for recent microarchitectural attacks. For each
processor, we tested the minimum microcode version supplied
by the mainboard and the most up to date version as of
February 2020. The Frontal attack was successful on all tested
processors. However, on older generations the microcode
version significantly changes the behavior leading to (worse)
success rates. A summary of the tested processors and
microcode versions can be found in Table II.
Our measurements indicate that the processors can be
separated into two groups with similar behavior: processors
with and without hardware mitigations against various mi-
croarchitectural attacks [32]. Interestingly, newer processors
with hardware mitigations built-in were more susceptible to our
attack, whereas older processors with mitigations in microcode
seem to add noise and thus have lower success rates on aver-
age. More in-depth analysis revealed that the most recent mi-
crocodes on processors without hardware mitigations add some
randomness to our experiments. For these configurations, every
run of the experiment exhibits a different behavior. Figure 8
shows the success rate for 500 separate runs each with 1000
samples. Note that most of the runs with the new microcode
show a random success rate. However, some runs exhibit a
clear timing difference leading to a > 95% success rate. The
adversary can detect which behavior a particular run is going
to exhibit by observing the timings of early movs aligned at
particular addresses. Thus she could decide whether to attack
or not before the secret is retrieved or provisioned, and re-
launch the enclave until its behavior is clearly distinguishable.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Potential Causes
The complexity of the microarchitecture of current Intel
processors makes it impossible to pin-point the cause of
the timing differences to a specific component. However,
we will discuss some components which we were able to
decisively exclude. We start with the memory subsystem,
then we investigate the execution engines, and finally we
will focus on the frontend. For each potential culprit in these
building blocks, we will describe an initial theory and then
try to refute or confirm it using performance counters (and
other measurements). Note that the performance counters are
sparsely distributed over the entire core and do not exhaustively
cover the entire microarchitecture. Therefore, investigation
into some hypotheses is very challenging if no performance
counters exist for the respective part of the processor.
1) Memory Subsystem: Observation O3.1 and O3.2 point to
potential causes in the memory subsystem. Specifically the fact
that the slow mov is around 100 cycles slower. For a current-
generation processor, 100 cycles is a rather large delay that is
usually only observed for accesses to external memory or the
last level cache. However, performance counters refute any
theory related to the memory subsystem since all performance
counters related to external memory or last level cache did
not show a difference between the slow and the fast mov.
2) Execution Engines: The execution engine gets a list of
instructions from the allocation queue as input and tries to
reorder and execute them as fast as possible. As far as we
know, it is completely decoupled from the frontend and does
not depend on any alignment since it works on decoded micro-
ops. However, given Observation O2.1, we know that the
alignment influences the timing difference. We thus rule out the
execution engine as the root cause of the timing differences.
3) Frontend: Observation O2.1 strongly hints at the
frontend as the culprit, since the fetch window is the only
structure which operates at a 16 Bytes granularity, matching
the 16 Bytes periodicity of the observations.
a) Micro-op Cache: The micro-op cache is a
microarchitectural structure in the frontend [53] which cache
holds previously decoded fetch windows and serves them
to, for example, repeated jumps to the same address. On a
micro-op cache hit, many cycles can be saved due to not
having to decode the instructions again. Our observed timing
difference might stem from hits and misses in this cache.
For some interrupts, the micro-op cache might miss, and the
instructions must be decoded again. For some others, it hits
and immediately proceeds to the reorder buffer. However, the
timing difference we observed seems excessively large for
this kind of small difference in the execution path. Besides,
performance counters that measure the behavior of the micro-
op cache show an equivalent number of hits in the slow and
the fast case. Thus, we rule out the micro-op cache as a cause.
b) Branch Prediction: Branch prediction is responsible
for predicting the future control flow. The core will fetch
ahead and speculatively continue to execute in the predicted
path. Not only branches rely on the branch predictor, but also
jumps where the target is not immediately known are predicted
(e.g., the target comes from memory). The resumption of the
enclave could potentially suffer from a misprediction for the
instruction that must be continued and thus suffer from a delay.
However, all performance counters that we measured did not
show any additional mispredicts for slow or fast instructions.
In summary, while we were able to decisively refute many
of the most common reasons for timing differences, none of
our tests were able to identify with reasonable confidence an
explanation for the timings exploited by the attack.
B. Defenses
There exist various defenses against the Frontal attack
some of which we will discuss in this section. First and
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foremost, we want to stress that constant time code [9],
[47] is a principled approach that thwarts every known side
or controlled-channel attack. We discuss these techniques
in Appendix B. As such it also remains secure against the
Frontal attack. Nevertheless, constant time code presents a
number of challenges in practice as it is hard to get right and
results in a high overhead in certain applications. Therefore,
in practice, many spot defenses against the known attacks
have been used since they are usually easier to apply and
more performant. However, most of these spot defenses are
circumvented by new attacks such as the Frontal attack.
While the behavior exploited by the Frontal attack stems from
the underlying hardware, the defenses we discuss are on the
software level. Hardware mitigations would also be possible,
but due to the lengthy turn-around time for new processors
that include the fix, software defenses are a lot more attractive.
Fix the Alignment: As seen in Section IV, the timing
of individual instructions depends on their alignment. The
Frontal attack only works with a rather specific alignment of
the two branches. Notably, branches with identical alignment
do not exhibit any observable timing difference. Therefore,
aligning the two branches to the same address (modulo 16)
leads to equivalent timings for both branches. However, this
approach will lead to increased binary size due to the inserted
unused space to align the branches.
VIII. RELATED WORK
A. Controlled-Channel Attacks
The attacker’s control over the OS enables novel noise-free
deterministic side-channels [7], [57], [60] known as controlled-
channels since the attacker (i.e., the OS) controls the channel.
Memory paging, the scheduler, the handling of interrupts and
exceptions, are a few examples of what the attacker can take
advantage of – every interface between the OS and the enclaves
can be leveraged in controlled channel attacks. The first SGX
controlled channel attack [60] abused the permissions of the
pages. They let the enclave generate a page fault for each page
it tries to access by removing access or execute permissions
to its own memory. The trace of page faults contains enough
information to, e.g., let attackers reconstruct images processed
in the enclave. Subsequent attacks made controlled channel
attacks stealthier, by observing that the CPU sets the accessed
and dirty bits [7], [57] in the page tables (PTs), thus allowing
to monitor the enclave’s execution without having to trigger
page faults. However, the resolution of page-based controlled
channel attacks is quite coarse, allowing the attacker to know
only whether any access in a page (4 kB) was made, but not
where within it.
The coarseness of PT based controlled channel attacks
is an element that defenses have latched on to protect
enclaves [49], [51]. These defenses either call for sensitive
code to be within a page [51] or randomize the page enclave’s
page layout so that page accesses cannot be correlated [49].
Even Intel specifies that controlled channels can be mitigated
“by aligning specific code and data blocks to exist entirely
within a single page” [27]. However, the resolution of
controlled channel attacks was increased through an attack
exploiting legacy memory segmentation [22], which is also
managed by the OS. While the attack only works under
uncommon circumstances (32 bit enclaves and smaller than 1
MiB), it can observe memory accesses at 1 byte granularity.
Our attack can trace the control-flow of an enclave with
instruction granularity, thus increasing the resolution of PT-
based controlled channel attacks. Like other controlled channel
attacks [41], [56], the Frontal attack relies on interrupts to
observe instructions and control-flow within a page. However,
it differs from them on the kind of branches that it can
exploit. Nemesis [56] can distinguish between branches that
have instructions with measurable timing differences, either
because they have different kinds of instructions in their paths,
or because they have a different number of instructions. Copy-
CAT [41] can track the control-flow in branches with a differ-
ent number of instructions. The Frontal attack allows differ-
entiating any branch, even if both paths contain the very same
instructions and are hence not vulnerable to other controlled
channel attacks. The only requirement for our attack is that the
branch contains at least a memory store in it. Such higher res-
olution hence defeats previous defenses that rely on controlled
channels being limited to observe only at a page resolution.
B. Microarchitectural Side-channel Attacks
Microarchitectural attacks exploit information leakage
due to shared microarchitectural resources across different
security domains and contexts. Among these shared resources,
the ones that have been exploited the most are the cache and
the branch prediction unit (BPU), but others have also been
exploited. We examine side-channel attacks based on these
shared microarchitectural components below.
1) BPU Attacks: The BPU records the outcome of recent
branches and jumps, to aid the CPU speculation. As it is
shared among contexts running in the same core, it can leak
information about the control-flow of another context. The
BPU was the focus of recent attacks, and particularly against
SGX [13], [25], [34]. Two structures of the BPU have usually
been exploited: the branch target buffer (BTB) and the pattern
history table (PHT). On modern CPUs, the BTB records the
virtual address (VA) of a branch instruction and the target
VA last taken from it. The BTB has been exploited against
SGX enclaves through Branch Shadowing [34] by shadowing
an enclave branch at the same VA in the attacker context. By
accurately synchronizing the attacker thread right after the
victim executed a secret dependent branch, the attacker can
detect what value was stored in the BTB for a victim branch.
The PHT keeps the state of a finite state machine (FSM)
based on the last decisions made for a branch. By monitoring
the state changes in the PHT FSM, an attacker can detect
the decisions made inside the enclave (or in another victim
process) for a particular branch [13], [25].
BPU attacks require either SMT [25] or time multiplexing
at a fine granularity between the victim and the attacker in the
same physical CPU core [13], [25], [34]. These attacks are,
in general, very sophisticated, and require reverse-engineering
the BPU. Given how hard this is to achieve, BPU attacks are
not easy to generalize to different microarchitectures and to
pull off in practice [19]. These attacks are also limited to the
type of branches they can exploit. For instance, they cannot
detect the target of indirect jumps [34].
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TABLE III. OVERVIEW AND COMPARISON OF RELATED SGX SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS.
THE FIRST TWO COLUMNS INDICATE WHETHER THE ATTACK CAN LEAK DATA-DEPENDENT
OR CONTROL-FLOW (CF) DEPENDENT SECRETS. THE Frontal ATTACK IS THE ONLY ATTACK THAT CAN LEAK THE DECISION MADE FOR ANY TYPE OF BRANCH
(AS LONG AS THEY CONTAIN A MEMORY STORE IN THEM), EVEN IF THEY ARE BASED ON UNCONDITIONAL JUMPS (E.G., AS A MITIGATION AGAINST BPU
ATTACKS), OR IF BOTH PATHS ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE SAME CL (E.G., AS A MITIGATION AGAINST CACHE AND CONTROLLED-CHANNEL ATTACKS).
Attack type / Name Data CF Resolution Synchronization with Victim Vulnerable branches
Cache [5], [17], [23], [39] Yes Yes 64 B (CL) Interrupt / SMT / Multicore If paths in different CLs
BPU [13], [25], [34] No Yes Branch Interrupt / SMT Only conditional branches
TLB [18], [57] Yes No 4 KiB (Page) SMT If different data pages accessed based on path
False Dependency [40], [62] Yes No 4 B SMT If data > 4B apart is accessed based on path
Port contention [4], [52] No Yes µops SMT If paths issue different µops
PT Controlled-Channel [7], [22], [57], [60] Yes Yes 4 KiB (Page) Page-Fault / Interrupt / SMT If paths in different pages
Nemesis [56] Low* Yes Instruction type and count Interrupt If paths have different instructions
CopyCat [41] No Yes Instruction count Interrupt If paths have a different instruction count
Frontal attack No Yes Instruction VA Interrupt Any branch (Must have a store)
*Leaks instruction operands (if they induce different execution time). E.g., multiplication to 1 vs. multiplication with big numbers.
As these attacks give fine-grained information to the at-
tacker, research has also focused on defenses against them [24],
[25], [34]. A holistic approach calls for flushing the BPU
state across context switches [25], [34], but this would require
at least a microcode update (or hardware changes) and incur
high performance penalties. A promising software mitigation
was proposed in [24]. This mitigation exploits the fact that
these attacks cannot infer the target of unconditional indirect
jumps. It transforms each conditional branch into a series of
random unconditional jumps that access portions of each code
block of the branch. However, even with this mitigation, only
the intended code block of the original branch will execute.
The Frontal attack can correlate executed instructions with
their virtual address. It can hence leak control-flow dependent
secrets even if a mitigation such as [24] is protecting enclaves
from BPU attacks, or if the BPU is flushed on context switches.
2) Attacks on caches and other shared resources: Because
caches are a resource shared across different contexts, an
attacker thread can infer which accesses a victim recently
made in another execution context by obtaining information
about the cache state. While cache attacks often exploit timing
variations in access latency to probe the state of the cache [16],
state changes can also be detected by using instructions’ side
effects [12], [21]. Cache attacks target different levels of the
cache hierarchy – from core-local data cache [1], [2], [5], [17],
[23], [39], [44], [54], [63] and core-local instruction cache [1],
[63], to the last level cache (LLC) which is shared amongst
all cores [20], [48], [61]. As code and data are shared in the
upper levels of cache (from L2), attacks that exploit them
can leak both control-flow-dependent and data-dependent
secrets [20], [48], [61]. Attacks on core-local caches require
to be co-located with the victim and thus usually rely on
simultaneous multithreading (SMT) or on accurate time-
multiplexing. On the other hand, attacks that exploit the LLC
can be run at the same time as the victim in another core.
The TLB is a shared buffer that stores the translation
information from VAs to physical addresses. It can be
exploited to detect whether a victim recently accessed a data
memory page [18], [57]. Since the TLB is shared only among
processes in the same core, it has been exploited only using
SMT so far. It can leak data accesses at a 4 kB granularity.
CacheBleed [62] was the first attack to demonstrate intra-CL
leakage for data accesses, achieving a resolution of 8B.
They exploited cache bank conflicts and write-after-read false
dependencies. Since the adversary is not in the same address
space, they induce a false memory dependency by making use
of 4k page aliasing - where an address x is considered the same
to x + 4096 by the hazard detection in the processor. Cache
banks are only present in older Intel architectures and therefore
cannot be exploited on newer CPUs. Moghimi et al. ported the
CacheBleed attack to newer CPU and SGX while improving
the resolution to 4B in their MemJam attack [40]. They exploit
read-after-write false dependencies in the processor memory
subsystem using 4k aliasing. The PortSmash [4] attack
extended the resolution available to the attacker even further,
by being able to detect issued microops in SGX enclaves.
It works by keeping specific CPU execution ports busy and
monitoring their execution latency. Execution in these ports
becomes slower when another context is using them, thus
leaking information about their control-flow to the attacker.
Summary: The main difference between the Frontal
attacks and previous attacks lies in the type of branches these
can leak. We compare it against all the attacks mentioned in
this Section in Table III. Note that the Frontal attack is the
only attack that is able to exploit unconditional and balanced
branches, even when they are contained within the same
page and CL. Previous defenses build either on the fact that
controlled channel attacks cannot leak at sub-page granularity,
or that BPU attacks cannot leak unconditional branches, and
are hence ineffective against our attack in general enclaves.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we observed a dependency between
instructions execution time and their alignment modulo 16.
We attribute these differences to the CPU frontend and its
fetch and pre-decode module. We leveraged these timing
dependencies to construct the Frontal attack, which can leak
the instruction pointer of an SGX enclave at the byte level
granularity. The frontal attack works against any kind of
branch, as long as they contain at least a memory store. It
can attack branches that are perfectly balanced, even when
they are contained within one cacheline. In our evaluation, we
showed that, depending on the target victim code, the frontal
attack achieves a success rate of more than 99%.
We tested every modern CPU that currently supports SGX,
and found them all vulnerable to this attack. We showed
several commonly used libraries where these vulnerable
branches are present. Finally, we discuss relevant defenses
to the attack, highlighting that any kind of secret-depending
branching should be avoided to guarantee confidentially in
SGX enclaves.
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APPENDIX
A. Responsible disclosure
We notified the Intel PSIRT on February 21st 2020 about
the Frontal attack. We sent them a previous version of this
paper and a proof of concept for the vulnerabilities we
identified. They informed us on April 22nd that their best
practices [26] already invite to not have secret-dependent
branching and therefore the attacks in this paper are considered
out-of-scope for their SGX libraries. In particular, they stated
that the balanced branches of the IPP crypto library we attack
in Section V-C4 are not used for secret-dependent operations
in the SGX architectural enclaves and hence do not pose any
security implication.
B. Data-oblivious Execution
Resilience against side-channel attacks is often a desired
security property when implementing software. This property
is particularly important for libraries and applications that
operate on secret and sensitive data on a system controlled
by the attacker.
Side-channel attacks exploit secret dependent variations
of the program execution. These variations are generally
of two types: control-flow dependent and data-dependent.
Control-flow secret dependencies are present whenever the
control flow of an application depends on the confidential
Data dependencies manifest when latency or resources
utilized depend on the input data. For example when different
memory accesses are performed based on some secret.
Countless attacks have exploited these types of dependencies
in the past [31], [45], [61], targeting in particular cryptographic
libraries, as extracting secret keys handled by these libraries
breaks any security guarantee built on top of them.
Data oblivious execution defends against side-channel
attacks by removing the two dependencies mentioned above.
This eliminates any variation in program execution that would
be potentially observable by the attacker. There are two ways
to obtain a data oblivious executable, first writing it directly
low level assembly code, second by performing an automatic
transformation at compile time from a higher level language.
Note that writing the code in a higher level language in a data
oblivious way, and then simply compiling it, might reintroduce
data or control flow dependencies at the binary level.
Several techniques for compiling and transforming code
from an arbitrary high level language to data oblivious code
have been proposed [37], [38], [42], [47].
One of the most complete constant-time transformation
is Raccoon [47].It removes any control flow and most data
dependencies, by transforming secret dependent branches into
a decoy and a real path that contain similar instructions. At
run time, both paths are executed, allowing only the real
one to modify memory, by carefully applying the conditional
move instruction (cmov). Raccoon runs on SGX enclaves
and uses the memory protections provided by it to ensure
confidentiality against an attacker that can otherwise read
arbitrary locations of memory.
C. Measurement Details
In this section, we describe the changes made to SGX-
Step [55] to collect the measurements presented in this paper
and present some interesting phenomena we noticed while
making these changes.
As recommended by the original SGX-Step, we run the
code in its own isolated core to reduce interference from
other processes and the kernel scheduler. We were running the
kernel with watchdogs disabled to avoid that any other kernel
function gets scheduled while we are single-stepping through
the enclave. We executed SGX-Step with the userspace
interrupt handler.
The modifications we made to the tool were aimed at
decreasing the noise and stabilizing the timing results. We
noticed that code executing outside the enclave would often
impact the variance of the collected latency. To reduce
this variance, we made three changes. The first was in the
aep_cb_func, which is called every time an interrupt
happens. We made the function constant time and made sure
that no function calls where performed in it. We tried to
reduce the cache footprint as much as possible as well to
make sure that no unnecessary data is evicted from it.
Second, to stabilize the interrupts and make them more
precise, we explicitly serialize the instruction stream before
setting the APIC counter and eventually entering the enclave.
Before this change, we sometimes observed multi-steps
even with very tight interrupt intervals. Interesting, while
debugging for multi-steps, we observed that we were never
able to interrupt in between fused macro-instructions, these
seem to be treated atomically by the CPU.
Third, we filter out the first measurement of a new page.
This is because the first measurements of a new code page
tend to have a high variance and be difficult to predict. This
is probably due to the fact that the new code page is not in
the cache, and somehow the CPU is not prefetching them in
time. Note that in a real attack, the adversary may want to
select gadgets that are not at a page boundary as she cannot
afford to throw away measurements.
Finally, there was one source of noise that was always
present and simply seemed to act as a constant shift across
measurements. Across enclave creations the distributions of
the measured latency had a variable mean. That is, measuring
the same enclave, but on different runs, gives different results.
However, the results were always consistent within the same
run. While the shifting was always between 0 and 200
cycles, this value is still so large that sometimes the timing
of nop instructions could be longer that the timings of a
multiplication (across different runs). Given this shifting in
the measurements we concluded that instructions timings are
not comparable across different runs.
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D. Outside Intel SGX
A question remains on whether these effects manifest only
while executing code inside an SGX enclave or whether they
are present also while running a program outside of the SGX.
Since we cannot send interrupts fast enough during a normal
execution, we decided to simulate the effect of the interrupts
by modifying the code in Figure 2 such that each mov triggers
an exception. We handle the exception and measure the time
it took to execute it, and then resume the program execution
from the instruction after the one that triggered the exception.
Note that exceptions are handled very similarly to interrupts,
with the key difference that the instruction that is currently
executing retires when an interrupt is triggered, while it needs
to be discarded when an exception is raised.
The timing differences between instructions in the two
branches were less pronounced than when the code was run
within SGX. Nonetheless, we were able to observe a (small)
correlation between the exception handling time of single
instructions and the branch being executed. This correlation
hints that the effects are not only present when interrupting
enclaves, but would manifest also when interrupting
applications if we had a fast enough interrupt timer.
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